Saturday, August 15, 2026

Inching towards Zimbabwe

Sri Lanka stands at a constitutional crossroads. A meeting between the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake concluded without resolution on Wednesday, August 13, 2026, leaving the nation's legal community deeply unsettled. The government's unwavering determination to push forward with the draft 22nd Constitutional Amendment (22A) β€” a proposal designed to increase the mandatory retirement ages of judges serving on the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeal β€” has triggered alarm bells across the political and legal spectrum. Critics warn that Sri Lanka may be taking deliberate, calculated steps toward the kind of institutional decay that reduced Zimbabwe from a promising nation to a cautionary tale of authoritarian collapse.

What the 22nd Amendment Actually Proposes

On the surface, raising the retirement age of senior judges may appear to be a benign, even progressive administrative reform. Proponents argue that experienced jurists should not be forced into retirement at an arbitrary age, and that the judiciary benefits from the wisdom that comes with decades of legal practice. However, the devil, as always, lies in the details. Constitutional scholars and members of the BASL have pointed out that the timing, the manner, and the political context surrounding 22A raise serious questions about the true motivations driving this amendment. When a government moves to alter judicial tenure structures without broad consensus, without transparent public consultation, and in the face of explicit opposition from the country's leading legal body, the reform ceases to look like modernization and begins to resemble manipulation.

The BASL's Concerns and the Failed Dialogue

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka does not oppose judicial reform as a matter of principle. What the BASL opposes is the process β€” or rather, the lack of one. Wednesday's meeting with President Dissanayake was expected to produce at minimum a framework for continued dialogue. Instead, it ended inconclusively, with the government signaling that it intends to proceed regardless of the legal community's reservations. This is not dialogue. This is notification. When a sitting president meets with the country's foremost legal institution and walks away without compromise, without concession, and without genuine engagement, it sends a chilling message to every institution that depends on independence to function effectively. The judiciary cannot serve as a check on executive power if the executive holds the keys to judicial appointments, tenures, and retirements.

The Zimbabwe Parallel: Why It Matters

The Zimbabwe comparison is not hyperbole. It is a historically grounded warning drawn from the playbook of democratic backsliding that political scientists have documented across multiple continents. Robert Mugabe's regime did not dismantle Zimbabwe's democracy overnight. It did so incrementally, through constitutional amendments, through the gradual subordination of independent institutions, and through the steady erosion of checks and balances β€” all while maintaining the formal appearance of democratic governance. Each individual step seemed manageable, even justifiable in isolation. It was only in retrospect that the cumulative effect became undeniable. Sri Lanka's current trajectory invites the same retrospective horror if course correction does not occur soon.

Judicial Independence as the Foundation of Democracy

Judicial independence is not a luxury reserved for wealthy, stable democracies. It is the foundational guarantee that protects citizens from the arbitrary exercise of state power. When courts are free from political interference, they can strike down unconstitutional legislation, protect minority rights, and hold even the most powerful executives accountable. When that independence is compromised β€” whether through overt intimidation or subtle structural manipulation β€” the entire architecture of democratic governance begins to crumble. Sri Lanka has already experienced the devastating consequences of institutional weakness during its decades-long civil conflict and its catastrophic 2022 economic meltdown. The nation cannot afford another self-inflicted wound of this magnitude.

What Must Happen Next

The government must return to the table with genuine intent to listen. The 22nd Amendment, in its current form and pursued through its current process, represents a dangerous precedent. Constitutional amendments that alter the structure of the judiciary must be developed through inclusive, transparent, and consensus-driven processes that involve the legal community, civil society, opposition parties, and the broader public. Rushing such amendments through in the face of organized legal opposition is not governance β€” it is overreach. President Dissanayake, who came to power on a platform of systemic change and anti-corruption reform, must recognize that the legitimacy of his administration depends on strengthening institutions, not bending them to political will.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka is inching β€” slowly, quietly, but unmistakably β€” in a direction that history has repeatedly shown leads to institutional ruin. The 22nd Amendment controversy is not merely a legal dispute about retirement ages. It is a defining test of whether this government respects the separation of powers that underpins democratic governance. The BASL's concerns deserve not just acknowledgment but genuine response. The people of Sri Lanka, who have already endured so much, deserve a judiciary that answers to the constitution β€” not to the executive. The time to reverse course is now, before incremental steps become irreversible strides.